This paper examines the impact that development theories have had on development policies, and the inverse impact of actual successes and failures in the global South on development thinking. It is argued that development thinking is at the cross-roads.
As Leo Tolstoy claimed in "Anna Karenina", "happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way". This wisdom, however, can be hardly applied to the development success of countries: it appears that success stories in the development and transition world are as different as they can be. It is not uncommon to come across contradictory statements about the reasons of economic success: economic liberalization and free trade are said to be the foundations of rapid growth in some countries, whereas successes of other countries are credited to industrial policy and protectionism; foreign direct investment that are normally considered as a factor contributing to growth, did not play any significant role in the developmental success of Japan, South Korea and pre-1990s China. Privatization of state enterprises, foreign aid, free trade, liberalization of the financial system, democratic political institutions -all these factors, just to name a few, are usually believed to be pre-requisites of successful development, but it is easy to point out to success stories, not associated with these factors.
In the 1970s the breathtaking economic success of Japan that transformed itself into a developed country just in two postwar decades was explained by "Japan incorporated" structure of the economy -special relations between (a) the government and companies (MITI), (b) between banks and non-financial companies (bank-based financial system), (c) between companies and workers (life time employment). After the stagnation of the 1990s, and especially after 1997 Asian financial crisis that affected Japan as well, these same factors were largely labeled as clear manifestations of "crony capitalism" that should be held responsible for the stagnation (Popov, 2008) .
In 1960 Rosentein-Rodan, widely regarded as the author of the Big Push theory, favored India, Burma, Argentina and Hong Kong as nations expected to achieve 3% annual growth per capita for a 5 year period. India, Burma and Argentina all achieved about 1.5% growth, whereas Hong Kong did much better. Chile, Egypt, Ghana and Jordan were also named for their unusually good growth prospects. But no one seems to have selected South Korea or Taiwan (Toye, 1989) .
Ideas matter a great deal. As Karl Marx put it, "material force can only be overthrown by material force, but theory itself becomes a material force when it has seized the masses" (Marx-Engels Reader, 1972, p.60) . However, development thinking of the second half of the XX century can hardly be credited for "manufacturing" development success stories.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to claim that either the early structuralist models of the Big Push, financing gap and basic needs, or the later neo-liberal ideas of Washington consensus that dominated the field since the 1980s has provided crucial inputs to economic miracles in East Asia, for instance. On the contrary, it appears that development ideas, either misinterpreted or not, contributed to a number of development failures -USSR and Latin America of the 1960s-80s demonstrated the inadequacy of import-substitutions model (debt crisis of the 1980s in Latin America and dead end of the Soviet type economic model in the 1970s-80s), whereas every region of developing world that became the experimental ground for Washington consensus type theories, from Latin America to Sub-Sahara Africa to former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, revealed the flaws of neo-liberal doctrine by experiencing a slowdown or even a recession in the 1980s-90s.
To reiterate, neither structuralists, nor neo-classical developmental theoreticians can claim credit for at least one case of economic miracle. Big Push and import substitution models, as well as economic liberalization theories that inspired economic policies in different countries and different periods, never and nowhere led to outcomes that today could be characterized as economic, much less social, success.
The policy of multilateral institutions -GATT/WTO, IMF, WB -could have been coherent in its own way: in different periods it was based on relatively coherent, even though not necessarily the same, set of economic theories. But this policy, as well as development theories, cannot be held responsible for engineering development successes, let alone economic miracles. Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea, South East Asia and China achieved high growth rates without much advise and credits from IMF and the WB (and in case of Hong Kong, Taiwan and China -without being members of GATT/WTO for a long time).
Economic miracles were manufactured in East Asia without much reliance on development thinking and theoretical background -just by experimentation of the strong hand politicians. The 1993 World Development Report "East Asian Miracle" admitted that non-selective industrial policy aimed at providing better business environment (education, infrastructure, coordination, etc.) can promote growth, but the issue is still controversial. Structuralists claim that industrial policy in East Asia was much more than creating better business environment (that it was actually picking up the winners), whereas neo-liberals believe that liberalization and deregulation should be largely credited for the success.
It is said that failure is always an orphan, where as success has many parents. No wonder, both neo-classical and structuralist economists claimed that East Asian success stories prove that they were saying all along, but it is obvious that both schools of thought cannot be right at the same time.
Why there emerged a gap between development thinking and development practice?
Why development successes were engineered without development theories, whereas development theoreticians failed to learn from real successes and failures in the global South? It appears that development thinking in the postwar period went through a full evolutionary cycle -from dirigiste theories of Big Push, financing gap and import substitution industrialization (ISI -1950-70s ) to neo-liberal deregulation wisdom of "Washington consensus" (1980-90s) , to the understanding that catch up development does not happen by itself in a free market environment, but with a lack of understanding what particular kind of government intervention is needed for manufacturing fast growth (2000 -onwards) . This paper examines the impact that development theories had on development policies, and the inverse impact of actual successes and failures in the global South on development thinking. It also seeks to examines the possibilities for the new development paradigm.
The Big Push: Theories and Practice
To what extent development thinking influenced actual policies in developing countries? Development efforts of the 1950s and 1960s were dominated by ideas of "Big Push," "Take off," "Incremental Capital-Output Ratio," "Two-Gaps," etc., all of which focused on aggregate growth rate to be achieved through large doses of physical capital investment. The logic was seemingly flawless: savings rate is low in developing countries, so they may stay in a bad equilibrium forever (development trap -just enough investment to create jobs for the new entrants into the labor force, but not enough to increase capital/labor ratio), unless there is a Big Push -mobilization of domestic savings or import of savings from abroad. The Big Push can ensure a transition to a good equilibrium, where it would be possible to stay on a growth trajectory. Savings gap is another side of the foreign exchange gap: not enough domestic savings to finance investment, not enough foreign exchange earned from export to finance imports of investment goods. What is the answer to the lack of savings to make investment needed to exit the poverty trap? Forced mobilization of domestic savings or foreign borrowings to finance import of machinery to carry out industrialization.
The Big Push ideas are usually attributed to Rosentein-Rodan (1943) and to Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) , but there were earlier predecessors in the 1920s -"the theory of primitive socialist accumulation" of Preobrazhensky (1926 Preobrazhensky ( /1965 and the two sector Feldman-Mahalanobis model (Feldman, 1928 (Feldman, /1964 , which is now acknowledged by researchers 2 and even omniscient Wikipedia 3 .
The Big Push in practice in the 1930s in the USSR was associated with enormous costs, but is exonerated by many even today as the only possible strategy to create heavy and defense industry in the agrarian country in the short period of time before the start of the Second World War (for a summary of debates see : Shmelev, Popov, 1989 , Chapter 2) . , , pp. 126-127, 136-137, 173. Stalin (1976 claimed that this was the only possible strategy of rapid industrialization.
"'We are fifty to a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We have to make good this distance in ten years. Either we do this or they crush us…", -he said in 1931, exactly 10 years before the Nazi Germany invaded the USSR. He even claimed that the elimination of prohibition in 1926 (allowing the government to receive excise taxes from sales of alcohol) was a price to pay for the reluctance of Western countries to provide the USSR with credits for industrialization (see Box).
Interestingly enough, though, the growth rates of labor productivity in the 1930s, the period of dramatic structural shifts, were high (3% a year), but not exceptional, whereas the highest growth rates were observed in the 1950s (6 %) - fig. 8 . Soviet catch-up development, however, looked impressive until the 1970s. In fact, in the 1930s to 1960s, the USSR and Japan were the only two major developing countries that successfully bridged the gap with the West. But high Soviet economic growth lasted only for less than two decades ( fig. 3 ), whereas in East Asia, it continued for three to four decades, propelling Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to the rank of developed countries.
BOX. Big Push Soviet style
"When we introduced the vodka monopoly we were confronted with the alternatives:
either to go into bondage to the capitalists by ceding to them a number of our most important mills and factories and receiving in return the funds necessary to enable us to carry on, or to introduce the vodka monopoly in order to obtain the necessary working capital for developing our industry with our own resources and thus avoid going into foreign bondage.
Members of the Central Committee, including myself, had a talk with Lenin at the time, and he admitted that if we failed to obtain the necessary loans from abroad we should have to agree openly and straightforwardly to adopt the vodka monopoly as an extraordinary temporary measure.
That is how matters stood when we introduced the vodka monopoly.
Of course, generally speaking, it would be better to do without vodka, for vodka is an evil. But that would mean going into temporary bondage to the capitalists, which is a still greater evil. We, therefore, preferred the lesser evil. At present the revenue from vodka is over 500 million rubles. To give up vodka now would mean giving up that revenue; moreover there are no grounds for asserting that this would reduce drunkenness, for the peasants would begin to distil their own vodka and to poison themselves with illicit spirits….
I think that we should, perhaps, not have to deal with vodka, or with many other unpleasant things, if the West-European proletarians took power into their hands and gave us the necessary assistance. But what is to be done? Our West-European brothers do not want to take power yet, and we are compelled to do the best we can with our own resources. But that is not our fault, it is-fate.
As you see, our West-European friends also bear a share of the responsibility for the vodka monopoly. Among many reasons for the decline in growth rate in the USSR in the 1960s-1980s, the inability of a centrally planned economy to ensure adequate flow of investment into replacement of retired fixed capital stock appears to be most crucial (Popov, 2007c) . The task of renovating physical capital contradicted the short-term goal of fulfilling planned targets, and Soviet planners therefore preferred to invest in new capacities instead of upgrading old ones. Hence, after the massive investment of the 1930s in the USSR (the Big Push), the highest productivity was achieved after the period equal to the service life of capital stock (about twenty years) before there emerged a need for massive investment into replacing retired stock. Afterwards, capital stock started to age rapidly, sharply reducing capital productivity and lowering labor productivity and the TFP growth rate. Source: Easterly, Fisher, 1995. If this explanation is correct, a centrally planned economy is doomed to experience a growth slowdown after three decades of high growth following a Big Push. In this respect, the relatively short Chinese experience with the CPE (1949/59-79) looks superior to the Soviet excessively long experience . This is one of the reasons to believe that transition to the market economy in the Soviet Union would have been more successful if it had started in the 1960s.
The second major shortcoming of the Big Push strategy in the USSR was the excessive reliance on import substitution. Even in market economies that did not have the problem of replacing capital stock like the centrally planned economies, but that tried to carry out import substitution policies for too long the results were disappointing. In the 1950s-70s in Latin America, India, and Africa this strategy more often than not led to the creation of non-viable "white elephants" and "industrial dinosaurs" that could operate behind the wall of protection with implicit and explicit subsidies, but that failed to pass the efficiency test once they were exposed to the winds of international competition.
Washington Consensus Versus the Big Push
After the debt crisis of the early 1980s and especially after the Soviet collapse in 1991, Big Push and ISI ideas were totally compromised and the pendulum of development thinking swung to the right -excessive government intervention was proclaimed to be In fact, countries that managed to achieve high growth rates were mostly net creditors, not net borrowers; their current accounts were positive, i.e. they were saving more than they were investing ( fig. 4) 4 "It is now accepted that the shift to a higher economic growth trajectory in India came about not in the 1990s, after neo-liberal economic reforms, but a decade earlier, from the early 1980s" (Ghosh, 2007) . The second wave was to Southeast Asian economies in the mid 90s, when the Asian economic miracle was all the rage. This wave ended in grief, with the crisis of 1997-8.
The third wave was to eastern European economies in the middle years of this decade.
This wave is ending in grief as we speak.
There have been some spectacular development success stories since 1980. But I'm not aware of any that were mainly driven by external finance. The point is not necessarily that international capital movement is a bad thing, which is a hotly debated topic. Instead, the point is that there's no striking evidence that capital flows have been a major source of economic success" (Krugman, 2009 ).
In view of this evidence, the developing country policy choice of a determined attempt to rely on external financing is ironic. It is also ironic that while development economists are preoccupied by "capital flowing uphill" problem (from developing to developed countries), the best growth record is exhibited exactly by countries with positive current accounts and large reserve accumulation that are generating this uphill movement of capital.
Marshal plan for Western Europe right after the Second World War may have been the first and the last success story of foreign financing contributing substantially to economic revival. But even in this case it could be argued that without appropriate domestic (European) institutions and mobilization of domestic savings, the (relatively) rapid growth would not happen. Foreign financing of Japan after the Second World War was insignificant, whereas Japanese postwar growth was more impressive than European.
The same could be said about aid -official development assistance (ODA). Whereas from the point of view of a developing country, it is certainly better to have assistance from abroad than not to have it, aid alone cannot become a crucial factor promoting development. The sheer magnitude of aid (about $100 billion annually) is too small to make a decisive difference (0.3% of GDP of recipient countries, less than total net capital flows by the order of magnitude and several times smaller than just remittances from migrant labor). The irony also is that aid, emergency aid excluded, is usually used efficiently in countries that have relatively good institutional capacity and can mobilize domestic savings themselves, whereas in countries with weak institutions and lack of domestic savings, where aid is most needed, it is often squandered. In countries that grow fast aid works, in countries that do not grow, aid doesn't help much, except in emergency.
On top of that, the magnitude of foreign assistance seems to depend mostly not on the needs of the South, but on the attitude of the West towards developing countries and the balance of forces between the West and the South. Plotting the relative size of ODA over recent 5 decades reveals at least two important trends ( fig. 5) . First, despite rhetoric and intuition that more aid should be given to poorer countries in difficult times, it appears that aid increased when resource (oil) prices were high, and decreased, when they were low. Arguably, the bargaining positions of the South improved in times of more favorable terms of trade, so the West was trying to ensure that the greater financial independence of developing countries is not translated into more leftist political orientation. Second, the clear leveling off between 1991 and 2001, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and before the 9/11 terrorist attack, was probably caused by the perception of reduced security threats to the West in the period "after communism -before terrorism".
Arguably, aid is an over-researched issue and is less important than possible gains from any of the following reforms: elimination of Western protectionism and especially agricultural subsidies; more benevolent attitude of the West towards trade and exchange rate protectionism of the South; loosening of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime for the South; allowing freer international migration of low skilled labor and efforts to stop brain drain from the South; control over the capital account and over FDI; recognition that the reduction of pollution should be done primarily by the West and that per capita emissions in the South can be as high as in the North; understanding that labor, environmental and human right standards in the South could differ from that in the North. 1960  1962  1964  1966  1968  1970  1972  1974  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004 Source: WDI database.
To conclude, not all the countries that pursued the strategy of the mobilization of domestic savings achieved a breakthrough, some failed, but without such a mobilization there were no breakthroughs either. The same seems to be true about protectionism and industrial policy: not all the governments that tried to interfere into the allocation of resources by the market managed to succeed, but without such interference there were no economic miracles. To put it differently, mobilization of domestic savings and government policy of allocating these savings across industries appear to be a necessary,
although not a sufficient conditions of the development success.
Why for non-tradables, while giving a huge boost to tradables, exports, profits, savings and investment (Polterovich, Popov, 2004; Gosh, 2007; Spiegel, 2007; Rodrik, 2008) .
This way or the other, economic miracles happened only in countries that relied on mobilization of domestic savings, not in countries that were seeking to bridge the financing gap through borrowing abroad, as development economists suggested. The crucial question then is how the national governments can mobilize domestic savings and to alter the allocation of resources in such a way as to achieve rapid, balanced sustainable and equitable growth. This is not only a matter of getting policies right, but also of having the appropriate institutional capacity that allows to design, adopt and enforce these right policies.
Development thinking is at the cross-roads. Development theories in postwar period went through a full circle -from Big Push and ISI to neo-liberal Washington consensus to the understanding that neither the former, nor the later really works in engineering successful catch-up development.
The Big Push theorists were right in arguing for the mobilization of savings, but their theories had a couple of weaknesses. First, it turned out that foreign savings alone, without mobilization of domestic savings, cannot produce rapid growth. There were no cases of economic miracles based solely on foreign, not domestic, savings. Second, quite a number of national experiments involving mobilization of domestic savings on a massive scale failed. Domestic saving is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of fast growth. Mobilization of domestic savings and even successful transformation of these savings into investment, does not guarantee fast growth. Investment should be channeled to projects with highest externalities and these projects have to finally pass the test of world market competition. Import substitution strategy could be good at the initial stages of the Big Push, but if it is not later supplemented by export orientation, it leads to the dead end: creation of non-viable industrial complexes not able to compete in the world market. Protection is a necessary condition of take-off growth, but should be supplemented with export promotion, if growth is to continue.
Washington consensus was an overreaction to the failure of ISI and the debt crisis of the 1980s -it threw the baby out of the bath together with the bathwater. It denounced not only import substitution, but also all types of industrial policies. And it denounced the need for special efforts to mobilize domestic savings. Meanwhile, the examples of fast growers -Asian tigers, South East Asia, China and India -all pointed out to the need for such mobilization and for the industrial strategy.
New Paradigm
The confusion in development thinking of the past decade may be a starting point for the formation of new paradigm. There is an emerging understanding that without mobilization of domestic savings and industrial policies there may be no successful catch up development. National development strategies for countries at a lower level of development should not copy economic policies used by developed countries; in fact, it was shown more than once that Western countries themselves did not use liberal policies that they are advocating today for less developed countries when they were at similar stages of development (Chang, 2002; Reinert, 2007; Findlay, O'Rourke, 2007) .
This general principle -that good policies are context dependent and there is no universal set of policy prescriptions for all countries at all stages of development -is definitely shared by most development economists. But when it comes to particular policies, there is no consensus. The future of development economics may be the theory, explaining why at particular stages of development (depending on per capita GDP, institutional capacity, human capital, resource abundance, etc.) one set of policies (tariff protectionism, accumulation of reserves, control over capita; flows, nationalization of resource enterprises -to name a few areas) is superior to another 5 . The art of the policymakers then is to switch the gears at the appropriate time not to get into the development trap. The art of the development theoretician is to fill the cells of the periodic table of economic policies at different stages of development.
The secret of "good" industrial policy in East Asia, as opposed to "bad" industrial policy in the former Soviet Union, Latin America and Africa may be associated with the ability to reap the benefits of export externality (Khan, 2007; Gibbs, 2007) . Exporting to the world markets, especially to developed countries, allows upgrading quality and technology standards and yields social returns that are greater than returns to particular exporters. It was shown that the gap between the actual level of development and the hypothetical level that corresponds to the degree of sophistication of a country's export is strongly correlated with productivity growth rates (Hausmann, Hwang, Rodrik, 2006; . To put it differently, it pays off to promote exports of sophisticated and 5 Acemoglu, Aghion, Zilibotti (2002a, b) suggested that appropriate policies depend on the distance to the technological frontier -the larger the productivity gap between the country in question and the most advanced (Western) economies, the more likely that protectionist policy, encouraging investment into "catch-up" pattern of development would be beneficial. The authors actually extend theses principles to a number of other policy areas (promotion of vertical integration and imitation of technology versus indigenous R&D -the larger the distance to the frontier, the greater the returns from vertically integrated companies and from reliance on imported technology). And there is a whole body of literature that provides evidence that trade liberalization is not always good for growth, especially at the earlier stages of development, whereas protectionism actually can be beneficial (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999; O'Roerke and Williamson, 2002; O'Roerke and Sinnoit, 2002 ; see for a survey: Williamson, 2002; Polterovich and Popov, 2005; Rodriguez, 2007; Kim and Lin, 2009 (Lu, 1999) .
Through the party cells in every village, the communist government in Beijing was able to enforce its rules and regulations all over the country more efficiently than Qing Shi
Huang Di or any emperor since then, not to mention the Kuomintang regime .
While in the late nineteenth century, the central government had revenues equivalent to here is that even without excluding these periods, Chinese development in 1949-79 was much better than that of most countries in the world and that this development laid the foundations of the truly exceptional success of the post-reform period.
To put it differently, by the end of the 1970s, China had virtually everything that was needed for growth except some liberalization of markets -a much easier ingredient to introduce than human capital or institutional capacity. But even this seemingly simple task of economic liberalization required careful management. The USSR was in a similar position in the late 1980s. True, the Soviet system lost its economic and social dynamism, growth rates in the 1960s-80s were falling, life expectancy was not rising, and crime rates were slowly growing, but institutions were generally strong and human capital was large, which provided good starting conditions for reform. Nevertheless, economic liberalization in China (since 1979) and in the USSR (since 1989) and later, Russia produced markedly different outcomes (Popov, 2000 (Popov, , 2007a 8 .
7 On June 15, 1976, when Mao's illness became more severe, he called Hua Guofeng and some others in and said to them: "I am over eighty now, and when people get old, they like to think about post-mortal things … In my whole life, I have accomplished two things. One is the fight against Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] for several decades and kicking him out onto a few islands and fighting an eight-year resistance war against the Japanese invasion that forced the Japanese to return to their home. There has been less disagreement on this matter… The other thing is what you all know, that is, launching the "Cultural Revolution." Not very many people support it, and quite a number of people are against it. These two things are not finished, and the legacy will be passed onto the next generation. How to pass it on? If not peacefully, then in turbulence, and, if not managed well, there will be foul wind and rain of blood. What are you going to do? Only heaven knows" (People's Web, 2003) .
The emerging theory of stages of development would hopefully put the pieces of our knowledge together and will reveal the interaction and subordination of growth ingredients. Successful export oriented growth model a la East Asian tigers seems to include, but is not limited to:
• Building strong state institutions capable of delivering public goods (law and order, education, infrastructure, health care) needed for development • Mobilization of domestic savings for increased investment
• Gradual market type reforms
• Export-oriented industrial policy, including such tools as tariff protectionism and subsidies • Appropriate macroeconomic policy -not only in traditional sense (prudent, but not excessively restrictive fiscal and monetary policy), but also exchange rate policy: undervaluation of the exchange rate via rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
